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3Executive Summary
In November 1994, Winnipeg’s nine urban hospitals announced that they agreed to “pursue opportunities
to share four common support services - food services, material management, biomedical waste disposal
and laundry to determine the potential for improving efficiency, reducing duplication and increasing
buying power.”  A new non-profit organization called the Urban Shared Services Corporation (USSC)
was created to manage the shared functions.  USSC is to be directed by a 16 member board, 9 CEO’s of
each hospital, a Winnipeg Hospital Authority representative, a representative from USSC as well as 5
appointed members from the private sector.
The Shared Food Services Patient Food Service Agreement signed  June 27, 1997,  involves four  parties,
the Urban Shared Services Corporation, Newcourt Capital Inc.,, the Winnipeg Hospital Authority, and
each hospital (which are nine in number).  Also involved, but not party to the above contract  is  VERSA
Food Services (now called Aramark Canada, Ltd.) who was awarded a five-year contract to provide
expert consulting and contract management services.  The company was involved in the design and
implementation of USSC’s food service system and since October 1997 has been supplying management
staff to oversee USSC operations and employees.   In the Shared Food Services contract,   Newcourt
Capital is to provide long term financing for the construction of a receiving and distribution unit to
accommodate the provision of patient food services by USSC for each of the hospitals.  Each hospital
agreed to acquire its total requirement of patient food services and related management services through
USSC for a period of 20 years, (USSC’s project amortization period).   Also party to the contract  is the
Winnipeg Hospital Authority,  a  corporation created without share capital on January 6, 1997,  whose
role is to allocate resources to and organize the delivery of hospital and other health services within the
City of Winnipeg.   
The main arguments that have been advanced for the change in food service delivery are that 
(i) savings will result from nonrefurbishment of  hospital cafeterias, (ii) lower operating costs can result from
a central plant operation, and (iii) savings can be achieved through a  reduction in losses on non-patient food
services.   An analysis of these issues suggests that given that a majority of hospitals have chosen to retain
their cafeteria services for non-patients,  the proposed $2.6 million savings from (iii) should not be attributed
to the Shared Food Service system.   Of the remaining 3.3 million in proposed savings, the realized amount
depends on the number of hospital cafeterias that need renovating, as well as the cost of refurbishment, as
well as the expected economies of scale of the single plant operation.  Given the range in estimates on the
respective costs of renovation versus the cost of the central facility, savings on financing costs may not be
realized.  Evidence of economies of scale for central food services remains unclear, implying that additional
savings from the central facility might not materialize.   The Shared Food Service contract also brings with
a number of contractual issues that might undermine the goals that are sought in the contract.
Apart from these issues, a full comparison of the present system versus the Shared Food Service approach
involves subtracting from the proposed savings the loss in labour premiums to laid off workers, as well as
any losses that might be incurred by Manitoba businesses if the food sourcing is shifted from Manitoba firms. 
 Finally,  the central issue of the respective quality of meals in the two systems remains unresolved.  Given
all these factors, there is considerable doubt whether the proposed change in hospital food service delivery
will yield real benefits to Manitobans.  
           
1
  Markham and Lomas (1995:5).   In Ontario, the percentage of services shared was laundry (47%),
laboratory (44%), dietary (15%), purchasing (16%), pharmacy (12%), consulting medical staff (49%),
medical laboratories (49%), X-ray (46%), medical education (19%) and active medical staff (17%).  
2
  The hospitals are Seven Oaks, Health Science Centre, Grace, Deer Lodge, Concordia, Victoria,
Riverview, Saint-Boniface General Hospital and Misericordia.
3
  News Release, November 24, 1994, Nick Kalansky, President of Seven Oaks General Hospital
and the urban hospitals chairperson for the shared services project.   In the press release, it was also stated
that preliminary studies “have shown there are potential annual savings as high as $16 million.”  Mr.
Kalansky also reported that “the cost/benefit studies involved eight committees encompassing 24 sub
working groups made up of about 200 staff from the nine hospitals.”  
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1.0   Introduction
The issue of health care costs has been front and centre in the development of health care policy in the
Province of Manitoba.   Faced with limited funds from higher levels of government, health care officials have
responded by searching for alternative delivery systems.   Almost every area of the health care system is
under scrutiny, from home care to the procurement system of hospitals.  A 1987 survey of Canadian hospitals
found that eighty-four percent of Canadian hospitals shared at least one service with another hospital.1 
This study examines this issue in the context of one proposed program to alter the nature of the health care
delivery system, the setting up of a joint system of food preparation to provide  food for hospital patients
in Winnipeg hospitals.   The proposed system is analysed from both a general perspective, examining the
nature of the contract that is in place as well as the economics of the project.  The latter details the expected
net benefits of the proposed Shared Services contract, and contrasts the proposal with the existing system,
and possible alternatives.   The economic analysis of the proposed system discusses issues regarding the
proposed benefits of single plant operation, as well as issues in the likely effectiveness of the contract in
ensuring contractual performance.  The study outlines a framework for how policy changes are evaluated in
standard cost-benefit analysis, and discusses how the net benefits of the proposed system would be affected
by a wider examination of the net benefits to Manitobans from the policy change.
 
2.0    The Contract for Shared Food Services: Background
In November 1994, Winnipeg’s nine urban hospitals announced that they agreed to “pursue opportunities
to share four common support services - food services, material management, biomedical waste disposal
and laundry to determine the potential for improving efficiency, reducing duplication and increasing
buying power.”2  A new non-profit organization called the Urban Shared Services Corporation (USSC)
was created to manage the shared functions.  USSC is to be directed by a 16 member board, 9 CEO’s of
each hospital, a Winnipeg Hospital Authority representative, a representative from USSC as well as 5
appointed members from the private sector.     It was stated at the time that the joint system was to be
phased in over six years, and it was announced that the changes being considered were “in service areas
behind the scenes, not in direct contact with patients and their families”. 3   At the time, hospitals shared
some services such as laundry services and biomedical waste disposal while each hospital had its own
food preparation facilities, product purchasing and warehousing.
The proposal was strongly endorsed by the hospital administrations and the provincial government 
who stated “we have been working closely with the urban hospitals group and commend them for the
4
  Health Minister Jim McCrae, Winnipeg Urban Hospitals News Release, November 24, 1994.
5
  Nick Kalansky, president of Seven Oaks General Hospital, Winnipeg’s Urban Hospitals News
Release,  November 24, 1994.  
6
 A meal tray per day is defined as involving three meals, breakfast, lunch and supper. 
7
  There are currently 416 positions in patient food services, and 194 in non-patient food services.
5
cooperation and creativity demonstrated in establishing this shared-services initiative  to help Manitoba
maintain its quality health care system.  These changes would help us to ensure that more of our available
health dollars are used for direct patient care”.4  It was also reported that it has been demonstrated that
“sharing hospital support services in other jurisdictions has been successful in improving efficiency and
lowering costs.  We’re sure it could be equally successful here.” 5 
Requests for Proposals were solicited from private companies to provide shared food services for the nine
Winnipeg hospitals.  In the proposal, USSC was seeking a minimum 50% investment in the total capital
costs of the system from the private sector.  At the end of the contract term, all assets would revert to
USSC (KMPG, 1996,p. 2).    Interested parties could submit proposals under any or all of the following
partnership models:  Model A would involve the development, financing and operation of  the system;
Model B1, would involve the development and financing of the system infrastructure, in partnership with
a Model B2 company who would operate the System under a Management contract.   
The Shared Food Services Patient Food Service Agreement of June 27, 1997  contract involves four 
parties, the Urban Shared Services Corporation, Newcourt Capital Inc., the Winnipeg Hospital Authority,
and each hospital (which are nine in number).  Also involved, but not party to the above contract  is 
Aramark Canada Ltd. (formerly VERSA Food Services Ltd.) who was awarded a five-year contract to
provide expert consulting and contract management services.  The company was involved in the design
and implementation of USSC’s food service system and since October 1997 has been supplying
management staff to oversee USSC operations and employees.   In the Shared Food Services contract,  
Newcourt Capital is to provide long term financing for the construction of a receiving and distribution
unit to accommodate the provision of patient food services by USSC for each of the hospitals.  Each
hospital agreed to acquire its total requirement of patient food services and related management services
through USSC for a period of 20 years, (USSC’s project amortization period).   Also party to the contract 
is the Winnipeg Hospital Authority,  a  corporation created without share capital on January 6, 1997, 
whose role is to allocate resources to Winnipeg hospitals and to organize the delivery of hospital and
other health services within the City of Winnipeg.   
The USSC’s facility is a $21 million, 34,000 square foot Regional Food Distribution Facility (RDF),
currently the largest of its kind in North America.  Construction began in September 1997 with the facility
becoming operational in August 1998.  The facility will require 84 full time equivalent positions who will be
required to prepare up to 8700 meal trays per day for member hospitals.6   USSC  estimates that the entire
hospital meal-delivery system will require 252 fewer equivalent full time positions; 182 of this reduction will
come from patient food services while 70 will come from non-patient food services (cafeteria and retail
sales).7    The diagram provided by USSC describes the Food Handling System model that is to be adopted. 
Most of the food will be bought in bulk, prepared and delivered chilled or frozen to the Regional Distribution
Facility (RDF). Employees will then assemble the meals on trays at the RDF, load them on to special
transport racks where they will remain chilled until delivered three times a day to the Receiving Centre of
8
 Request for Proposal (USSC) Data Package, prepared by  KPMG, July 29, 1996.
9
  St. Boniface and Health Sciences Centre account for  approximately 50% of total operating costs,
and contribute approximately 60% to patient and non-patient related recoveries. 
10
  This is close to the estimate of $22.6 million estimated by USSC, see Appendix 9.
11
  There is some variation in how meal days are provided, trayed versus bulk, as well as dietary
restrictions.  
12
  This is close to the 20.2 million reported in Appendix 7.
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each of the nine hospitals.  The racks are placed in specially designed rethermalization carts, where they
remain chilled until about one hour before required where the food designed to be served hot is heated.  The
food trays and rethermalization equipment are designed to separate hot and cold food.    The trays are  then
distributed to patients in the hospital wards by hospital workers.  The empty meal trays are then returned to
Hospital Receiving Centre where they are picked up by USSC and returned to the Regional Distribution
Facility for cleaning and inspection. 
3.0     The Estimated Financial Costs and Recoveries of the Present and Proposed System         
(i) The Present System
For the budget year 1996/97, the total operating costs of  food services for the nine Winnipeg hospitals was
approximately $29 million (Appendix 2).8  Of those costs, approximately 25 percent are recovered,  21
percent   through cafeteria charges and other vending services for non-patients, and  4 percent through patient
related recoveries.9   Thus, approximately $22 million is the estimated annual net cost of food services for
Winnipeg hospitals.10  
Regarding the output of the system, in 1996/97 approximately 1.7 million meal days were provided, with 
approximately 70% (1.2 million) being provided for patients and 30% for non-patients.11   If we attribute 
70% of the total operating costs of $29 million to patient meals, this amounts to roughly $20.3 million.12  
If the remaining 30% of the total operating costs is attributed to non-patient meal costs, we obtain a total
operating cost of  approximately 8.7  million dollars which is close to the amount reported in Appendix 6
($8,770,236). Total non-patient recoveries for 1996/97 are approximately $6.4 million (Appendix 4), with the
difference approximately $2.3 million which is reported in Appendix 7.   This is the estimate of the current
deficit on non-patient food service.   
(ii) The Proposed System
Under the proposed system, the total annual food costs for patient services would be reduced from 20.2 to
16.9 million, or 3.3 million, a 16.3 percent reduction.  In reducing these costs, the total number of equivalent
full time positions (EFTs) for patient food services would be reduced from 416 to 234 or a reduction in 182
positions, a 43 % reduction.    
Under the proposed system, the deficit on non-patient meals of 2.3 million is to be converted to a surplus of
approximately $270,000.   This would be achieved by reducing total operating costs by 22%, with total
labour costs including benefits being reduced by approximately 2.2 million or 40% of current total operating
13





costs, with food costs increasing by approximately 260 thousand, or increasing by 10%.  The reduction in
labour costs would be achieved by reducing the number of EFT (Equivalent Full Time)
positions by 70 (194-124), or 36%.
The summary of expected savings of the proposed system is then equal to an approvement of 2.6 million on
non-patient services and 3.3 in patient services, a total of 5.9 million (Appendix 7).13  
   
4.0  An Alternative Food Service Model: A Hybrid System
Apart from the Status Quo situation, or the Shared Food Services contract, an additional possibility that was
explored was some combination of the two situations.  This was the option recommended by the consulting
firm Food Management Consultants Ltd in their report submitted July 1993  to the Steering Committee of
the Winnipeg Urban Hospital Council charged with assessing the feasibility of centralized food services.  
Some highlights of the report are the following.
 Their assessment indicates that annual operating costs could be reduced by $4.6 million by 
developing a shared food service for Winnipeg/Brandon, $3.3 million for hospitals and $1.3 for 
Personal Care Homes.
 Estimated savings are lower for Winnipeg/Brandon due to the relative efficiency of the current 
food service system which was estimated at $300-$600 less per bed per year than in Ontario.  The 
low cost nature of the food service costs for Health Science Centre and St. Boniface is supported 
by the HayGroup Consultants who compared the food service costs for a cross section of 20 
hospitals in Canada.   They show that both HSC and St. Boniface were both above the median in 
terms of cost efficiency, with the HSC having the lowest food service costs of the 20 hospitals 
surveyed.14  
 They proposed a 60/40 split between the amount of food items that could be procured versus the 
amount that could be produced at a Food Production Centre.          
 
 The most cost effective system is to build, own and centralize production facilities to meet  40% of
the prepared food requirements and procure or source from the private/public sector the 
remaining 60% of the required food.  This option includes centrally assembling  into trays 
requirements for up to  2,200 beds.  For this option, the capital costs are estimated to be $25.4 
million.
 A range of savings of between 700,000 and $1.3 million are possible by applying a business oriented
collaborative approach to managing the cafeteria services at the hospitals.   
 As of 1992-1993, revenues from cafeterias and catering have been reduced due to fewer staff in the
hospitals and the effects of the recession. 
15Privatization is defined as the selling of previous government owned assets to the private sector,
effectively transferring production of the good and service from public control to private control.  It can
include circumstances where the public sector solicits bids from the private sector  to provide services
previously provided by the public sector requiring the construction of new assets.   In this case, the
responsibility is transferred but assets are not transferred, which is sometimes called contracting out.     
16
  Technically, the proposed change involves a change in management, in which the responsibility
for providing the patient food services is now managed by Aramark Canada Ltd. rather than hospital
administrators.
17
  As of June 1993, Health Sciences Centre, Victoria General Hospital, the Winnipeg Municipal
Hospital and the Brandon General Hospital had submitted capital planning projects for food service facility
redevelopment to Manitoba Health for funding (Food Management Consultants Ltd (1993:8)).    
8
 There is great economic value attainable by transferring much of the food manufacturing required by
the health services sector to the ready food marketplace in Manitoba. 
A number of these issues will be addressed in the context of discussing a number of economic issues 
regarding the contract for shared food services.   
5.0   The Contract for Food Service Provision: Economic Issues
A number of arguments have been advanced by governments or public officials to alter the nature of the
services provided by the public sector.    Some feel that the continued provision by the public sector would
require a substantial reinvestment in capital and equipment, which for one reason or another, the
government is unwilling or feels is unable to undertake with public funds.    Others pursue contracting out
based on a belief that the good or service can be provided more cheaply by the private sector.15   The
proposed centralized food service plan has elements of both of these reasons.16  Two central issues are  the
proposed cost savings that would result from the nonrefurbishment of  the existing hospital food cafeterias,
and the cost savings that result from centralizing food service preparation in a single facility.
These are examined in turn. 
5.1   Proposed Cost Savings from Non Replacement of Hospital Cafeterias
A major reason given for the centralized food service plan is that it eliminates the need for the renovation of
the hospital cafeterias in a number of the affected hospitals.17  Data provided by USSC suggests 
that the capital outlay to rebuild hospital kitchens at all Winnipeg hospitals would equal $36.1 million, which
would result in annual financing costs of $4.5 million (Appendix 9).   The capital outlay to build the shared
food services is estimated by USSC to be $23.7 million.  In contrast to these estimates, the consulting firm
Food Management Services Ltd, who was asked to investigate the feasibility of a shared food services by
a hospital steering committee, estimated in 1993 that the capital costs of hospitals to meet their
requirements over the next 15-20 years were $29.8 million while the comparable costs for a Food
Production Centre to produce 100% of the prepared food requirements was $28.1 million.  
   
It is interesting to comment on the cost of financing the project through Newcourt Capital.  Using the
estimates provided by USSC in Appendix 9, in exchange for the $23.7 million dollar loan , the contract calls
for the hospitals to make annual mortgage payments to Newcourt of $2.8 million for twenty years, which is
18
 See Appendix 9.
19
  Letter from D’Arcy & Deacon, Barristers and Solicitors, to Joseph Shiel, Chief Executive Officer,
Urban Shared Services Corporation, June 13, 1997.  The letter also states that “the refusal of even one
Facility to honour its contractual commitments for food services with USSC may jeopardize not only the
Shared Food Services Project but also USSC itself.”
20
 D’Arcy & Deacon, June 13, 1997.
21
 Shared Food Services Patient Food Service Agreement , June 27, 1997, p.7.
22
 Shared Food Services Patient Food Service Agreement , June 27, 1997, p.7.
23
 Department of Finance, Manitoba.  It is important to note that borrowing by Crown corporations is
undertaken by the Province, which charges an additional .25% to borrowers, the total rate being the Crown
Corporation Rate. 
24
  The annual difference in interest costs from borrowing at even an 8% government interest rate
versus the 10.5% rate charged to USSC, is approximately $400,000 dollars, yielding a total difference in
interest costs over the 20 year period of approximately $9 million dollars.
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the amortization period.   Using a standard annuity formula, this implies an annual interest rate of
approximately 10.5%.18  Only USSC rather than the individual hospitals will be asked to mortgage and
encumber its assets in favour of Newcourt.19   One legal opinion is that an important part of Newcourt’s
security will be the assignment or transfer of all or part of each hospital’s payment to USSC for food services
to Newcourt.20   To ensure that the payments are forthcoming from the hospitals, USSC has ensured that even
if the centralized facility “has not become operational by the expected date, the Hospital shall nonetheless be
invoiced by USSC for its share of Fixed Costs..”.21  Furthermore, “if at any time during the term of this
Agreement, any or all of the anticipated Patient Food Service may not be able to be provided by USSC, the
Hospital shall nonetheless pay to USSC its Pro Rata Share monthly on the first business day of each
month”.22  
The obvious alternative to private financing would be for the public sector to borrow directly from the public. 
The difference is that the loan is secured by the assets and income generating ability of the Province and the
risk pooling and risk spreading advantages available to a large and diversified borrower 
like the Province.  However, to the extent that the risk cannot be diversified away, it may raise the total risk
to the Province.  In general, because of the guarantees provided by governments, their borrowing costs are
considerably lower.  For example, the following in brackets are the benchmark 20 year interest rates that
existed in the months preceding the June 1997 contract date: March 17 (7.34); March 24 (7.40); April 7
(7.62); April 14 (7.57); April 21 (7.41), May 5 (7.20), May 20 (7.19).  The  interest rate that the Province of
Manitoba paid on funds borrowed for 20 years on June 2, 1997 was 7.18%.23    The difference in borrowing
costs facing the Province versus USSC is significant.  For example, even if USSC’s cost estimate of $36.1
million to renovate all the city’s hospital cafeterias is used, the annual interest cost would be $3.40 million at
a 7% rate, and $3.67 at an 8% rate, considerable less than USSC’s estimate of the $4.5 million annual
financing cost.24
  
An additional argument given for financing the project using the private corporation, Newcourt Capital, was
that this approach does not involve the use of scarce public sector dollars to construct and maintain the
25
  Derek Johannson,  Newscom: An Urban Shared Services News and Communication Periodical,
November 1997, p.1.
26
  When the lowest cost market structure is a single firm, this is called a natural monopoly.
27
   For example two firms each with their own fixed costs may be able to produce a good at an
average cost of $10.00 while a single firm with twice the output and only one fixed cost or plant may be
able to produce it at a cost less than $10.00.   
28
  According to Lauzon and Poirier (1995:7) the average hospital serves about 100,000 meal days
per year. Among their other findings was that the cost per unit of meals in the privatized food service
departments was on average $2.25 higher than the cost per unit in comparable state run departments.
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facility.   As can be seen, given the structure of the contract, the primary obligation for payment to fund the
financing costs rests with the individual hospitals.   Whether the public sector is ultimately involved depends
on whether USSC and Newcourt believe that Manitoba Health would ensure that the individual hospitals
meet their purchasing obligations from USSC.  If so then the ultimate liability rests with Manitoba Health
and indirectly the Province.  If not, then the decision to use USSC as the vehicle to borrow the funds, means
that the project transfers the liability resulting from the financing of the facility from Manitoba Health (where
it would be if the facility was publicly financed) to USSC and ultimately to  the hospitals (who must make
financing payments to Newcourt out of hospital charges).  However given that the hospitals obtain funding
from the Provincial government through Manitoba Health then the liability of the public sector may be
ultimately unchanged in the two circumstances.   Only if the public sector was not being charged for the
construction costs could one state that the public sector avoids the use of scarce public sector dollars in
either scenario.    
5.2   Proposed Cost Savings from a Single Plant Operation
A second major reason given for centralizing hospital food service provision has been advanced by the Chair
of USSC who stated “our goal is to utilize economies of scale to heighten efficiencies and deliver true
savings in the delivery of support services.”25   Economies of scale exist when large scale production can
result in lower average costs of production.   For example,  if there are substantial fixed costs, then it may be
cheaper to have one firm provide the good or service then a number of smaller firms, which is the result of
declining average costs of production.26  Essentially, the fixed costs can be spread over a larger number of
units produced and sold, which lowers average cost at which the good can be provided.27   In this case,
efficiency dictates that only a single firm operate the facility.
Is there evidence of economies of scale for shared patient food services between hospitals?   Studies that are
publicly available on this issue are scant.    In looking at economies in multi-hospital arrangements in
general, Markham and Lomas (1995:9), state that “the literature has been mixed, however, with respect to
economic benefits, with the US data suggesting that there may be diseconomies of scale.”   A paper that
investigates the issue of economies of scale for the conventional food system in the Province of Quebec is  
Lauzon and Poirier (1995) from the Accounting Department of the Universite du Quebec a Montreal. 
Among their findings is “that the advantage gained from a high production volume declines considerably as
soon as the number of meal-days is greater than 15,000 meal days per year, which is the production rate of
very small institutions.”28  Lauzon and Poirier’s analysis shows that per unit costs reach a minimum when the
29
 Lauzon and Poirier (1995:15).
30It should be noted that if there are no economies of scale, then any size of firm is consistent with
efficiency.   That means that  there are no advantages to large scale production or correspondingly
disadvantages to large scale production. This case exists where the fixed costs are low, or the minimum
efficient scale, the output at which average costs are lowest is a low level of output of the good or service. 
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number of meal days per year reach 100,000.29  Appendix 3 shows that all Winnipeg hospitals served more
than 100,000 patient and non-patient meal days in 1996-97.  It appears that all Winnipeg hospitals are
operating at a relatively efficient scale using the conventional food service system.  The question that remains
is what are the   economies of scale that can achieved from the Shared Food Service system that is being
proposed.  No empirical evidence has been released which indicates what is the optimal scale of such a
system.  
Suppose it is granted that the Shared Food Service system is at the scale at which minimum average costs
can be achieved for the patient food services at Winnipeg hospitals.   In a world where there are economies of
scale, there are essentially four  possible options.30   Each option brings with it strengths and weaknesses in
allocating resources.   The first is public ownership and public provision.   In this case, the public manager is
instructed to produce the output which is consistent with efficiency, in this case where price equals marginal
cost of production.   With falling average cost of production, this means that price (p)  will be less than
average cost (ac) which would warrant a subsidy equal to (ac-p)q* where q* is the output where the demand
curve intersects the marginal cost curve.  Where there are economies of scale, efficiency is not consistent
with break even operation.  Critics of this approach argue that the incentive to control costs for public
managers is weaker than the corresponding incentives for private firms.  Supporters argue that in cases where
it is difficult or costly to monitor the private firm’s contractual performance, public operation may be
preferable.   
The second possibility is private provision with government regulation.  This is essentially the contractual
solution with the allowable price, service and rate of return being determined by a regulatory board.   This
type of regulation is not without cost, involving substantial monitoring and possible efficiency losses, where
the firm may wish to pad its capital base to get a higher rate of return than is consistent with efficiency. Price
in this case is set equal to average cost, which is higher than marginal cost which means that some efficiency
is sacrificed unless an explicit subsidy is paid to the private firm.  If firms know a subsidy will be paid based
on their reported costs, then there is an incentive to overstate their average costs of production, which will
bring forth a larger subsidy than is required.     
The third possibility is private provision with no regulation.  This is generally seen as the worse possible
outcome with profit maximization leading to a higher price and lower output than is consistent with
efficiency.    
 A fourth possibility is public ownership and private provision.   In this case, the public sector owns the asset
and contracts with a private firm to produce the good.   If there is no collusion at the bidding stage and
sufficient number of bidders, then the public sector can allow the firm that submits the best proposal to use
the facilities, which it would lease from the government.   The contract can also provide for a subsidy to the
firm.   The government also has recourse to setting up an additional bidding stage if the firm is not living up
to the contract.    
31
 Williamson used the case of CATV provision in California, which featured a bidding stage
where firms offered to supply cable service and a certain price to consumers.   
32
 The contract between Versa Services Ltd and USSC as of April 1, 1997.
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If the fourth possibility is chosen, then it is generally recognized that to ensure that the best outcome occurs,
the contract for food services must be contestable, which means that the firm that initially receives the
contract faces an effective threat that if it does not perform according to the spirit of the contract that the
contract will be terminated and a different supplier will be sought.  As recognized by Demsetz (1968)
potential competition may play the role of actual competition even in circumstances where a single firm
production is the most efficient.   However, it was recognized by Williamson (1976) that a necessary
condition is that the assets used to produce the product be easily transferable.  Williamson argued that in
cases where assets are difficult to transfer, for example, individuals with technical expertise, the incumbent
firm has a strategic advantage.   If a firm that is contemplating making a bid to replace the incumbent firm
knows that it may take a fair bit of time to acquire effective control over the assets, then it may be reluctant to
make a bid, which gives the incumbent firm the ability to set higher prices or lower service than is desired by
the government or the public officials.  It has been recognized that one possible solution is for the
government to own or contract with as many of the specific assets as possible, which it then leases to the
private firm which then produces the service.31
It is important to outline the role of Aramark Canada Ltd. (formerly Versa Services Ltd.) in the Shared Food
Services Contract.32  Versa was responsible for the design, implementation and management of food services
for the centralized facility also in consultation with USSC and Newcourt.  USSC agreed to provide Versa
with suitable equipment at each site for the provision of  Food Services, specifically, adequately equipped
and operational facilities including heating, air conditioning, refrigeration and utilities service.  USSC also is
to provide Versa with an inventory of service wares and small equipment at each facility.   Each facility is
responsible for the maintenance of all rethermalization equipment at each facility, the maintenance costs to
be reimbursed by USSC.  Versa is to purchase all food and beverages necessary for the provision of food and
catering services at each site and may receive and retain allowances from certain suppliers regarding the
purchases of supplies made by Versa.  Versa and USSC are to develop a joint cost and quality control
advisory group, to ensure that patient/resident’s needs are met.  This will include the development of a 
patient satisfaction survey.  The initial term of the contract is for 5 years with automatic renewals for further
terms of 5 years, provided that neither USSC or Versa wishes to discontinue the contract at that time.  Each
party has the right to terminate after 90 days, by giving the other party 120 days written notice, subject to the
payment of a disengagement fee by USSC to Versa which equals $50,000 per year that the contract is
prematurely terminated.   
Versa was to negotiate a separate contract with each facility for non-patient food services, the financing of
site specific non-patient renovations, equipment and other capital requirements from Newcourt.   Versa is to
guarantee a net improvement on non-patient food services, which will require a return to Versa of 1.5% of
net improvement above an agreed benchmark (or $10,000 per facility, whichever is greater) for
administration and support costs associated with Versa’s marketing and merchandising costs.        
How does the contract meet the criteria for contestability, assuming that there are economies of scale in food
delivery and preparation?  First, the term of the Aramark’s management contract is for 5 years which
provides the firm with considerable shelter from other bidders.   Second, the construction of the facility is
designed to meet the production needs of the successful bidder.   This is fine as long as all dimensions of the
contract can be monitored and all stakeholders are satisfied with the service.  In developing a contract, a
33
 Note that the initial operator would not be able to obtain a monopoly return on the assets since they
are general, and must receive the competitive return.
34
 As of February 20, 1998, boards of six of the nine city hospitals voted to continue their own
cafeteria operations rather than turn them over to Aramark Canada Ltd. as part of the central food processing
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crucial issue to consider is what recourse do the parties have if the contract does not live up to the
expectations of both parties.    For example, suppose the food quality is deemed to be less than what was
anticipated in the signing of the contract.   While the ability to terminate the contract provides some leverage,
it may not be sufficient to ensure contractual performance. If the assets used to produce the food service were
nonspecific, and the purchaser of the food services wished to solicit other bids, then the initial company
could sell the assets to either the new company or the purchaser (who would then sell them to the new
operator), and both the provider and the purchaser could leave the contract, relatively unscathed.33     If the
assets used to produce the food service were specific to the user, then they cannot be transferred to another
food service provider without the new provider spending additional funds to adapt the specific assets to its
food service operation.  These conversion costs allow the original provider a degree of monopoly power,
because the new operator would only be willing to take over the contract, only if he/she can provide the
service to cover both the variable costs and the initial conversion costs. Thus the specific assets are a barrier
to entry allowing the incumbent firm a degree of bargaining power not present if the assets are non specific to
the user.   Therefore, the nature of the contract signed here makes it unlikely that the food service provision
would be contestable, which means that the disciplining device of other potential suppliers is weakened if not
eliminated.   
An alternative or complementary control device that is often used by the principal in a contract is to keep
available the option of making the good or providing the service in house.   This often acts as an effective
control mechanism to ensure contractual performance.  That is, it is often wise to keep sufficient capacity
available to act as a check to ensure that the private firm fulfills the spirit of the contract.  If the purchaser of
food services decides to eliminate the in house capacity,  then the capital requirements of  new capacity act as
a capital barrier to entry, making the option of providing the good or service in house less attractive.  This
enables the firm who is currently performing the service to have additional bargaining power, reducing its
incentive to fulfil its contractual obligations.   
                
5.3   Issues in Providing both Patient and Non-Patient Meal Services
An important issue to be addressed is the issue of providing both patient and non-patient meal services.
Efficiencies that result from providing two types of services using the same production facilities are called
economies of scope.   Economies of scope exist if  it is cheaper to provide both services using the same
production facilities then it would be to have two facilities each providing only one service.  Examples of this
are local and long distance services, business class and regular passenger service.   The Shared Food
Services contract would involve economies of scope if  the central facility was expected to provide meal
services to both patients and non-patients.    Similarly, the Status Quo, or the present hospital food service,
also benefits from economies of scope, since the hospital kitchens provide food services to both patients and
non-patients alike.
Non-patients currently purchase 30% of the meals produced by the present hospital food services.   If the
staff at Winnipeg hospitals prefer meals provided by their hospital kitchens or other food service providers,
then the Shared Food Services contract will not provide cost savings due to economies of scope.34     In
unit, Winnipeg Free Press, February 20, 1998, p. A8.
35
 This point is a major reason why the agreement requires that hospitals purchase all their patient
meals from USSC.  
36
  A useful reference for the issues addressed here is Leroy Jones, et al. (1990), which discusses cost
benefit methodology applied to the selling of public enterprises.       
37
 The issue of monetary measures of welfare has a long history in economics.   The conventional
approach in welfare economics is to consider two measures of welfare change, one measure is called the
compensating variation which states that in the event of a price increase, how much would we have to
compensate the individual in terms of income to allow him or her to be indifferent to the original position and
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addition, the lower total volume of meals produced by the Shared Food Services contract will raise the
average meal cost per day since the fixed costs are spread over a smaller number of meal days.35        
A useful way to think about this issue is that rather than rebuild existing cafeterias, new facilities are being
constructed to provide food for hospital patients.   Included in this comparison would be an analysis of  what 
would become of the existing cafeteria space.   The comparison depends on whether it is to be eliminated,
which would free up space for other hospital activities if suitable, or whether a certain level of in house
cafeteria capacity was required.  If this space was to be used by the Shared Food Services facility, its
opportunity cost should be included in the cost of the Shared Food Services system.    If some cafeteria
capacity was required, then the appropriate measure is  the additional costs of providing meals to hospital
patients from renovated hospital cafeterias versus the costs of providing meals to patients from the central
facility.   Included in this comparison would be whether staff will continue to be served by the existing
hospital cafeterias.   If the staff at the Winnipeg hospitals are not willing to purchase the food that is
provided by the Shared Food Services facility, then the proposed cost savings from non-patient meals
which result from the Shared Food Services system should not be attributed to the new system. 
Moreover,  depending on the participation rate of non-patient in the food service program, the costs of patient
meal services would be affected, since a lower volume of meals would be produced, raising the average meal
day cost.    
6.  The Contract for Shared Food Services: Determining the Net Benefits
    
 
6.1     Overall Assessment of the Choice of Provision 
In evaluating the net benefits from the proposed change in food services, the change in net benefits to society
is defined as the sum of the changes in net benefits received by the groups or individuals affected by the
change.36  Among the major groups or individuals effected are consumers, producers, the government,
labour, and other businesses.  One measure of the net benefits to society is 
Net benefits = the change in (consumer benefits + government receipts +
profits to firms + benefits to labour)
 
Leroy et al. argue that the above equation misses an important issue in cost-benefit analysis, which is the
distribution of the surplus.   The net benefit measure described above involves the sum of the dollar
surpluses earned by all groups in society.37  It is generally felt that if the profits are earned by foreign
the higher price and higher income level.   An alternative measure is the equivalent variation.  Both these
measures depend on the individuals own preferences regarding his or her well being in the respective states.
It has been shown that a third measure, consumer surplus, falls in between these two measures, if the good
under consideration is a normal good.     
38
  There are several  methods to estimate the value that is to be placed on food services provided. 
One is a survey approach, which is to ask all patients what they would be willing to pay for a meal of a given
quality.   Assuming truthful revelation of willingness to pay, we could order the responses from highest to
lowest to determine the hospital willingness to pay curve.      Alternatively, we could find a comparable meal
provided by another food service provider which is purchased by a similar cross section of people and
estimate the willingness to pay from that approach.   Private hospitals which charge for meals and allow
consumer choice of providers would be a useful model to use.   Third, you could ask unbiased experts in the
food industry, what they envision the demand curve facing a firm would be that was supplying the given
quality of meal.
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firms then the weight should be zero; however, if the profits are earned by firms from another province,
then those profits might be included as a net benefit but given a lower weight then if it the profits were
earned by a local firm. 
These categories of the change in net benefits are discussed in turn.
(i) Measuring the Change in Consumer Benefits 
One measure of the change in consumer benefits is the change in consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is
defined as the total valuation of the quantity of goods that are chosen minus the total expenditure that
consumers must pay. The change in consumer benefits is equal to the change in the benefits received by
consumers from the policy change.
If  hospital patients had to pay for their own meals, their willingness to  pay for hospital meals could be
illustrated by a demand curve for hospital food of the usual shape.  The downward sloping demand curve
can be thought of as an ordering of willingness to pay by patients from the highest to the lowest.  At
higher prices, fewer meals would be chosen.  The  willingness to pay for hospital meals is  undoubtedly a
function of the quality of the meals.   A higher quality of food would increase the willingness of patients
to pay for meals, a lower quality would reduce their willingness to pay.
A difficulty in analysing the net benefits from the hospital meals is that hospital patients do not choose
their food service provider, the hospital decides, on the menu and allows the patient to choose from
among the set of meals (subject to dietary restrictions).  Thus, what we have to estimate is the value that
patients would place on the meals, which may differ from what it costs the hospitals to provide the meals.  
For example, if a patient had to pay for his or her own meal, which costs the hospital say $5.00 to
provide, only those patients valuing the meal at $5.00 or more would purchase the hospital food, if there
was a choice of food services.   However, if there is no choice then the patient would consume the food
which costs $5.00 which is valued at say $4.50, thus we have a social loss of $.50 on that meal, assuming
competitive supply of the hospital meals.38                
Suppose we feel that we have a reasonable estimate of the willingness to pay for hospital meals, then to
measure the net social benefits, we subtract from the total willingness to pay for a given quantity and
quality of meals, the total social costs of providing those meals, to measure the net social benefits.  In
39
 Allison Bray, Winnipeg Free Press, October 18, 1998.
40
 Letter to the Editor from Joe Shiel, Chief Executive Officer, Urban Shared Services Corporation,
Winnipeg Free Press, Monday, November 23, 1998.  The taste panels consist of hospital staff, patients, and
their families at each of the five hospitals that were served at the time.  
41
 Allison Bray, Winnipeg Free Press, November 1, 1998, p. A1.
42
 CUPE Research Branch (1998:3).
43
 CUPE Research Branch (1998:8). 
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aggregating the net social benefits we may want to weight the social benefits differently depending on
who receives them. For example, it may be considered more important that low income individuals
receive the consumer benefits then do higher income individuals, therefore we might set a higher weight
on those benefits in aggregating the net social benefits.  Or we might weight the consumer benefits
received by children higher than older individuals.   One can imagine a number of ways in which
distributional issues would enter the calculation.  It is important to realize that lower quality of meals
would result in a reduction in the aggregate willingness to pay and hence a reduction in the net social
benefits of any given quality of meals.   
There is considerable controversy regarding the quality of meals under the status quo versus the Shared
Services Contract.   In the initial period of operation, residents of Deer Lodge Hospital lodged numerous
complaints over the food service from the new system.  USSC confirmed they had been flooded with
complaints over poor quality.39  USSC claims that the status quo system was “marginal at best” and that
as far as the new system is concerned,  “based on taste-panel results for the period Oct. 10-29, cleanliness
has improved to 85 per cent, taste has improved to 70 per cent and the final score has improved to 81 per
cent, or an A.”40      
It has been reported that in some cases, food service systems that had been centralized were subsequently
changed back to the old system.  For example, the British Columbia psychiatric facility in Port Coquitlam
reverted back to the system of in-house preparation at the request of the ombudsman after numerous
complaints.  In other cases, for example, the Atlantic Health Sciences Corp. (AHSC) who had switched   
over to serving reheated food at its 12 hospitals and health centres in 1995,  maintains that its system,
after a barrage of complaints, has improved and AHSC has no intentions of reverting to in-house
preparation.41 
Other evidence comes from the Canadian Union of Public Employees, CUPE Research Branch (1996,
1998).  Their most recent research seems to indicate that the shared food services system in New
Brunswick and Ontario are incurring significant operational and financial difficulties.  For example, the
poor quality of food has made headlines in New Brunswick papers, with the research branch concluding
that “the shared system is no doubt proving extremely costly”.42   In Ontario, they argue that “since
switching from conventional to cook-chill and shared food production, Toronto hospital has had its first
ever deficit in their dietary budget ($2 million).”43  These examples suggest that the shared services
system might be more difficult to operate than its proponents suggest.       
 
(ii)   Measuring the Change in Government Receipts
44If the costs of patient and non-patient food services could be separated as estimated, then $2.3
million could be saved merely by eliminating non-patient food services.  However, hospital staff and visitors
might prefer having meals within the hospital, and might be willing to pay a premium for availability within
the hospital.  Alternatively, if demand for non-patient meals was unresponsive to price (perfectly price
inelastic), then the $2.3 million could be reduced by raising prices.   For example, to eliminate the deficit for
the St. Boniface Cafeteria, the revenue per meal day would have to be increased by 27%, from $13.00 to
$16.63.   The more likely scenario is that as the price is raised for non-patients, the demand for non-patient
meals would fall, the rate affected by the number of alternatives available (as well as their prices) for
cafeteria food service.         
45
 The $5.9 million in improvement has been estimated by USSC to come from converting a 2.3
million deficit to a $270,000 (approximately 2.6 million improvement on non-patient food services) with the
remaining $3.3 million to come from patient food services (Appendix 7).. 
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Government receipts can be of two types.  In the case of a public enterprise  it takes the form of dollar
losses or gains.   If the activity generates taxes, then government receipts take the form of taxes.  The
measure to include here is the change in government receipts.  In cost-benefit analysis, the group termed
government can alternatively be thought of as the general public.  In the Shared Services contract, USSC
estimates the benefits to Manitoba Health as $7.6 million, which is the difference between their estimates
of the total annual costs of the Status Quo versus their Shared Services contract (Appendix 9).
In the estimates given of potential savings, $5.9 million given in Appendix 7, the crucial issue is how to
evaluate the deficit on current non-patient meal services of $2.3 million dollars.  If this loss is due to
underpricing of non-patient meals, then an elimination of this loss involves a transfer of benefits from
those purchasing non-patient meals, not a net gain.   That is, Manitoba Health’s gain of $2.3 million is
offset by a loss of benefits from non-patient meals of $2.3 million.   Only if the $2.3 million is the result
of lower average costs on non-patient meals, with the quality held constant, should the $2.3 million to
included as a net benefit of the new system.44          
In addition, USSC estimates an improvement of 3.3 million on patient food services.45  However, if the debt
servicing costs of the new facility are subtracted,  then the net improvement is reduced to approximately
$550,000.  It appears that USSC’s estimate of net improvement assumes that there is no depreciation of the
centralized facility over the 20 year period. 
(iii)  Measuring the change in Profits to Firms
The change in profits can be felt in a number of areas.  If the policy change affects the profits of one firm, it
equals the increase or decrease in profits earned by the firm accompanying the policy change.  If more than
one firm is effected then the change the total change in profits is equal to the sum of the total profit changes
that effect all firms.      
For the Shared Food Services contract the key issue is what happens to the change in respective profits
of Manitoba firms under the contract versus the status quo.  If profits that are currently earned by
Manitoba firms are transferred to firms outside the Province, then these lost profits must be entered as net
losses from the Shared Food Services contract.   If the profits of existing firms supplying food to Manitoba
hospitals are reduced but other Manitoba firms are increased by the same amount, then there is no net loss or
gain that results from the Shared Food Services contract.  This is the issue raised by the consulting firm 
Food Management Consultants Ltd. in their report.   USSC has maintained that “53% of the items served
46
  USSC, Frequently Asked Questions, p.5. 
47
 A central issue is who earns the profits from the sale of the food inputs to USSC, not solely
whether a purchase is made from a local company.  If local firms act merely as distributors to USSC, earning
very little of the value added, then the profits still go to firms outside Manitoba.     
48
 Information was requested from the Chairman of USSC on job related numbers related to the new
system on December 2, 1998.  The information requested included how many individuals took early
retirement, how many were laid off, etc.  However, the requested information has not been released to the
author.   In lieu of that information,  
49
  Winnipeg Free Press, April 21, 1999.
50
  Urban Shared Services Corporation, News Release, April 28, 1999. 
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are ‘Made in Manitoba’.  100% of all USSC food, in fresh packaged and frozen form ... is purchased right
here in Winnipeg from locally owned food distribution companies and wholesalers.”46  The key issue that has
generated controversy is how these figures compare with the previous system.47  This information  was
requested from the Chairman of Urban Shared Services Corporation, on December 2, 1998.  As of yet, no
figures have been released.   This information is key to determining whether Manitoba firms have been
affected by the introduction of the Shared Food Services.   
     
(iv) Measuring the Net Benefits to Labour
The use of labour is an important issue in the provision of hospital food services.    To the extent that  the
labour which is now employed is reduced, the loss of net benefits workers brought about by the
reorganization must be taken into account.48   There are two principal cases to consider.   If the workers who
lose their jobs remain unemployed,  then the difference between the wages they were earning and the wage it
would take for them to take any type of job is subtracted from the net benefits.   If some of the workers find
alternative employment at a lower wage, then the difference between their former wage and their new wage
is subtracted, that is we subtract the wage premium they were earning at their former job.   This return above
a worker’s opportunity cost is called the labour externality that accompanies a project, which is a standard
element of cost benefit analysis.   It is true that the reduction in the use of labour will be offset somewhat by
an increase in the use of labour in the production of imported food services,   the  increased labour will be a
benefit earned by the other jurisdiction.  These are defined as the change in benefits to labour.    
    
    
7.0   Recent Developments
The preceding analysis was based principally on the business plan of USSC regarding the Shared Food
Services contract.  It is useful to highlight a number of recent events.  On April 21, 1999, it was announced
the provincial auditor will review of the operations of USSC, after receiving information that suggests the
facility may be having technical and financial problems.49   On April 28, 1999, USSC announced that for
1998-99 fiscal year, hospital food service costs were $2.5 million higher than projected.50   Of the total, $1.3
million was for higher fixed costs, and $1.2 for higher variable costs, primarily food costs.  These additional
costs were incurred despite the fact that Winnipeg’s two largest hospitals, Health Sciences Center and St.
51
  It has been suggested by union officials that USSC is running at full capacity.  Officials of the 
United Food and Commercial Workers suggest that currently 137 employees are producing 6,000 meals per
day, whereas USSC budgeted for 117 employees (84 EFT) to provide 8700 meals per day.  They argue that
USSC is 70% over budget on labour costs and 63% over on their food costs.  Personal communication, May
4, 1999.  
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Boniface General Hospital were not using the new system.  On June 1, 1999, the CEO of USSC, Joe Shiel
announced that he was resigning from the position for personal reasons.  
 
It is unclear at this time, whether these increases in operating costs for the Shared Food Services contract 
are permanent or temporary.   If the higher costs are permanent then the decision regarding the future food
services for Winnipeg Hospitals once again becomes an issue.  One option is to use the centralized facility to
serve the smaller Winnipeg hospitals, while Health Sciences Center and St. Boniface General Hospital retain
their hospital kitchens. This is particularly important if, as has been suggested, the facility is already close to
capacity.51  The problem with this approach is that different hospitals will have different types of food
services, the food provided using the centralized facility, and the conventional hospital food.   It may be
problematic to have two different food systems available if they differ markedly in quality.   A second option
would be to discontinue the centralized food service system, pay out the remaining amount of the loan, with
proceeds from the sale of the all assets that are vested with USSC.  This option would require a thorough
appraisal of all assets including the facility itself.  The value of the building would depend on its suitability
for other uses.   A third option would be for the Health Sciences Centre and the St. Boniface General Hospital
to provide meals to the smaller hospitals using the conventional or modified food service approach which
would make use of existing facilities. 
7.0    Conclusion
This paper has attempted to analyse a particular contract proposal for the provision of hospital food services
in the Province of Manitoba.   A number of conclusions can be made.
 The net benefits from the Shared Food Services contract depend critically on the quality of meals
provided by the new system, which affects the demand by non-patients for food services.
 If non-patients do not choose the meals provided by the Shared Food Services contract then the
benefits from economies of scale and economies of scope are reduced.
 If the current loss on non-patient meals is due to underpricing of the meals, then the Shared Food
Services contract which proposes a slight surplus on non-patient meals, involves a transfer of
benefits from non-patients to the public sector, not an efficiency gain.   If the current loss on non-
patient meals is due to higher costs of the Status Quo system, rather than underpricing of meals, and
the non-patients consider the Shared Services meals to be equivalent to the present system, then the
Shared Food Services contract represents an efficiency gain.     
 To the extent that hospitals cafeteria workers are earning labour premiums, then the difference
between their current wage and their future alternative wage must be subtracted from the net benefits
from the reorganization.
 To the extent that hospital food inputs are purchased from non-Manitoba suppliers, the reduction in
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profits from these Manitoba firms must be subtracted from the net benefits from the reorganization.
 If the quality of meals provided by the Shared Food Services contract is below the current quality of
meals, then the lower value patients and non-patients place on meals must be subtracted from the net
benefits from the Shared Food Services contract. 
 It is important to determine the rights of patients regarding the quality of meals provided to them.  It
seems clear that in areas where patients are paying explicitly for meals, such as nursing homes, that
the residents should be treated as paying customers with all the usual rights that accompany the
consumer.  In the case of hospitals, an ombudsman should be charged with the task of ensuring that
patients receive meals of acceptable quality.  It seems unreasonable for that quality to be determined
solely by the supplier of the food service.  While direct patient complaints might help to monitor
food quality, it may be the case that some people may be reluctant to complain because they feel it
might not be effective.         
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Meals per








Seven Oaks 280  727         0     210     937      37.3       6148
Health Sciences 845 2061      105    1400    3566    149.0     23,697
Grace General 276  867        50      332    1249      47.5       7,711
Deer Lodge 461 1225      105      398    1728      58.4     10,560
Concordia 196  625      152      194     971      26.4       5,449
Victoria General 253  687        22      212     921      37.5       6,750
Riverview 388  842          0      126     968      54.9       7,580
St. Boniface 554 1509        32      951    2492      n/a     20,357
Misercordia 224  636        10      262      908      45.7       6,508
Total 3477 9179       476    4085   13,740      na     94,760
Notes:
1.  Future Number of Beds, KPMG (1996:7)
2.  Patient Meals which are trayed, KPMG (1996:8)
3.  Patent Meals in bulk format for dining room service KPMG (1996:8)
4.  Cafeteria, catering, etc. KPMG (1996:8).  
5.  Staffing budgeted 96/97, Equivalent Full Time positions (EFTs) for food and nutrition
     services at each hospital, including clinical nutrition, patient and non-patient services, KPMG                               
  (1996:10)
6.  Total space currently allocated for each Department of Food and Nutrition Services, does not include
     cafeteria and other non-patient specific space, KPMG (1996:14)    
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   15,600
   15,600
  434,200
2,420,260
   132,500
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     26,465
  
     35,948
       1,092
2,652,779
   306,616
   306,616
 2,959,395 
  418,000
     2,000
  
   53,000
  
  473,000
   38,500
   38,500
  511,500
  285,000
     7,000
  
   
     8,000
 
 300,000
   15,000




    13,828
   110,500
   124,328
   390,828
  356,600
     2,200
  
    46,500
  
  
    13,900
 
  419,200
     38,200
    38,200
  457,400
   175,500
   
     23,400
   
 
  198,900
     38,100
     13,800
    
     51,900
    250,800
  978,986
    50,896
    49,936
    41,000




    58,843
   135,921
   






    52,825
    52,825
   386,425
 6,367,668
   837,733
 7,205,401
Source:  Data Package, USSC Shared Food Services Request for Proposal, August 15, 1996  
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     10,010
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  80,635
 13,128
   3,356
   2,870
   99,989
   71,467
   90,498
    2,183
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     8,500
     5,300
   82,481
    62,000
     4,600
     2,770
   69,370
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    1,900
    1,200
   113,700
 124,127
   41,601
   12,801
     4,552
     3,424
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   81,780
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    2,538
  30,630
  195,590
    11,982
     3,836
     2,070
     3,228
    26,907
         224
        128
   243,965
   32,757
   32,757
    21,923
        538
      3,800
      1,157
         615
     28,003
    20,500
      3,080
     4,061
   27,641
   27,240
    4,600
    4,300
       320
    36,460
    1,800
   1,800
   76,489
    2,932
    2,943
    2,169
    1,658
    3,014
   12,733
  101,938 
    26,385
     5,500





131,730  533,850   132,746   193,334  110,122   105,830
   
  115,500 288,443   122,514 1,734,069
Source: Data Package, USSC Shared Food Services Request for Proposal, August 15, 1996 
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Appendix 4: Proposed Annual Costs of Shared Services Contract
Proposed Direct Annual Costs
RDU
-   Labour
-   Food
-   Other 
Total RDU Direct Annual Costs 
                (2,827,625)
                (6,157,483)
                (1,234,015)
               (10,219,123)
Hospital
-   Labour
-   Food
-   Other
-   Patient Related Recoveries
-   Add’l Clinical Cost Ctr Cost
Total Hosp Direct Ann Costs
Total Direct Annual Costs (1)
                (3,356,752)
                   (385,498)
              (INC ABOVE)
                 1,174,144
                 (2,300,430)
                 (4,868,536) 
                (15,087,659)
Proposed Indirect Annual Costs
 -   Computer - RDU
 -   Computer - Hospitals
 -   RDU Prep (Versa)
-    RDU Training (Versa)
-    Transportation
-    Op’g @$ 16/s.f. x 34m s.f.
-    Asset Mgmt/Equip reserve  
-    Equipment Replacement
Total Indirect Annual Costs (2)
Total Proposed Annual Costs (1+2)
                     (13,845)
                     (46,430)
                     (10,000)
                     (40,000)
                   (886,928)
                   (544,000)
                   (160,000) 
                   (175,100)
                (1,876,303)    
              (16,963,962)
Source: USSC, Shared Food Services, Commitment Document Package, June 23, 1997.
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Appendix 5: Construction and Other Development Costs for Shared Services Contract
Regional Distribution Facility (RDU)
-   Land
-   Building
-   Fd Svc Equip
-   Furnishings
-   Misc Equip
-   Gen’l Conditions
-   Contingency
    Total Hard Costs
-    Design Fees
-    Other Soft
-    Permits
     Total Soft Costs    
     Total Costs (RDU)
                     (522,500)
                   (4,108,149)
                   (2,694,500)
                        (80,000)
                        (40,000)
                      (468,094)
                      (739,074)
                    (8,652,317)
                       (760,631)
                       (865,050)
                         (91,916)
                     (1,717,597) 
                    (10,369,914)
Facility
Patient
         - Renovation
         - Fd Svc Equipment
         - Misc Equip
         - Gen’l Conditions
         - Contingency
         Total Patient
Non-Patient
          - Renovation
          - Fd Svc Equip
          - Cash registers/ Misc Equip
          - Gen’l Conditions
          - Contingency
          Total Non-Patient 
Soft
           - Design Fees
           - Other Soft
           - Permits
           Total Soft Costs
Total Facility
Total Construction Costs (Facility plus RDU)
Other Development Costs 
           - Meal Delivery System
           - Computer System
           - Financing Costs 
           Total Other Development Costs
Total Construction & Other Development Costs
Estimated Debt Service 
                    
                    (1,042,202)
                       (377,560)
                         (20,000)
                         (97,695)
                       (153,746)
                     (1,691,203)
   
                        (424,915)
                          (90,065)
                          (19,567)
                   (INC ABOVE) 
                          (53,460) 
                         (588,057)   
                         (158,749)
                         (227,878)
                           (19,184)
                         (405,811) 
                      (2,685,071)
                                                (13,054,985)       
                      (4,616,842)
                      (1,009,511)
                      (2,782,652) 
                                                 (8,409,005)
                                               (21,463,990)
                                                 (2,744,242) 
Source: USSC, Shared Food Services, Committment Document Package, June 23, 1997.
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1,023,363

































   36,514
  128,956





   165,576
   525,582












   679,552
2,587,921























   127,151
1,174,464
   204,907
2,575,022
2,878,637





































   89,622
  544,405
    93,594
1,300,652
1,390,520




   33,978
 442,394
445,995
   3,601 
3,030,085
   414,610
2,853,171
   511,240
6,809,106
7,078,189






 984,248  21,198  192,357  182,584  192,829    74,399 657,528  245,519
   
2,638,948
Source: USSC, Shared Food Services, Committment Document Package, June 23, 1997.
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Appendix 7: Shared Food Services Business Case Summary
Patient Food Service
Total current costs (annual)                                             20,271,391
Proposed annual costs                                                     16,963,962
Difference                                                                       3,307,429
Total current costs (annual)                                              20,271,391
Proposed annual costs                                                     16,963,962
Debt service                                                                    2,744,242
Proposed annual costs plus debt service                             19,708,204
Net Improvement                                                                563,187
Net Improvement plus debt service                                     3,307,429 
Non-Patient Food Service
Current Surplus (Deficit)                                                 (2,369,865)
Proposed Surplus (Deficit)                                                   269,083
Net Improvement                                                             2,638,948
Total Improvement                                                         5,946,377 
Source: Shared Food Services Commitment Document Package
Appendix 8: Job and Employment Facts estimated by USSC
                                                                                                  Positions (EFT)1
                                                                                         Today        Future         Reduction
Patient Food Services                                                            416            2342           182
Non-patient Food Services                                                     194            124              70
    
Total                                                                                     610           358             252           
Source: Shared Food Services, Urban Shared Services Corporation
Notes: (1) EFT - Equivalent to Full Time
          (2) Hospitals 150, Regional Distribution Facility 84
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  Appendix 9.  Estimates by USSC of Total Economic Benefit to Manitoba Health*  
($ in Millions) Status Quo
 
USSC
-     Construction
-     Transition                     
Expenses
-     Total Capital 
      Outlay
 Capital outlay to rebuild hospital









-      Annual Capital
       Financing Costs
-      Combined Annual
       Food Services 
       Operating Costs
-      Total Annual







 Total Annual Economic Benefit to Manitoba Health =  27.1 - 19.5 = 7.6 million
* Source: Shared Food Services, Urban Shared Services Corporation
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Appendix 10: Analysis of Cafeteria Revenue and Expenses for St. Boniface General Hospital
Actual























  Meal Day
- Food Cost/
  Meal Day
- Revenue /
   Meal Day
- Meal Day/EFT
 
   872,320
   598,561
     43,379
     24,805
     14,256
       8,077
  1,561,398
   1,427,760
       46,026
   1,473,786 
     (87,612)
     28.65
    135,375
       4,337
     139,712
       11.18
         6.42
         4.39
        10.55
     4,876.51
   868,809
   467,067
     50,710
   111,428
     44,671
     11,394
1,554,079
1,329,470
   203,160
1,532,630
  (21,449)
   27.61
 127,059
   21,236
 148,295
    10.48
      6.61
      3.45
    10.34
   5.371.06
 845,368
 488,856
   45,692
 118,429
   45,491
     1,830
1,505,666  
1,180,335




    25.59
   95,629
   13,960
  109,589
     13.74
       8.79
       4.51




   28,148
 110,163
   42,165
     1,232
1,490,193
1,084,394
   154,872
1,239,266
 (250,927)
    24.52
   81,500
   12,395
   93,895
     15.87
       9.89
       5.67
     13.20
   3,829.32
 765,025
 528,503
   37,911
   99,709
   49,381
     3,150
1,483,679
1,083,842
   181,933
1,265,775
  (217,904) 
    23.03
   79,818
   14,703
   94,521
     15.70
       9.15
       6.11







   9,007
1,469,470
1,047,628
   172,850
1,220,478
  (248,592)
    24.3
   80,586
   13,296
   93,882
    16.63
      9.02
      6.94
     13.00
   3863.00 
 
Source: United Food and Commercial Workers, January 23, 1997.
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